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et al.: Right to Be Present

RIGHT TO BE PRESENT
N.Y. CoNST. art. , § 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions and shall be informed of the nature and the cause of
the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses againsthim.
U.S. CONST. amend. V:

In all criminalprosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right..
to be confronted with the witnesses againsthim ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT

People v. Barnes 1
(decided October 23, 1995)

Defendant, Robert Barnes, appealed his conviction of
manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a
weapon in the fourth degree on the grounds that his fundamental
right to be present at all material stages of the trial pursuant to
the New York2 and Federal 3 Constitutions was violated. 4 The

defendant based this claim on the fact that he was neither
informed of, nor present during, an in camera conference
1. 633 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in relevant part: "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear
and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed
of the nature and the cause of the accusation and be confronted with the
witnesses against him." Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and.., to be confronted with
the witnesses against him. . . ." Id.
4. Barnes, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
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"wherein the Assistant District Attorney advised the court that he
recognized one of the prospective jurors and that [the Assistant
District Attorney] had attended the high school where the juror
taught." 5 The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that
the defendant's "lack of knowledge regarding the Assistant
District Attorney's familiarity with the prospective juror clearly
6
prejudiced the defendant," and thus entitled him to a new trial.
During voir dire, an in camera conference was held in the
7
absence of the defendant but in the presence of his attorney.
During the conference, the Assistant District Attorney informed
the court that he recognized a prospective juror and that the juror
taught at the high school attended by the Assistant District
Attorney. 8 Examination of the trial record revealed that the
defendant was not informed of the Assistant District Attorney's
disclosure during the conference and that neither the defendant
nor his attorney were asked whether the jurors chosen in that
round were acceptable to the defense. 9 Subsequently, the
defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and
criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, from which
he appealed. 10
The defendant claimed that his absence from the in camera
conference abridged his right to be present under both the New
York and Federal Constitutions. 11 The court first noted that the
"defendant has a fundamental right to be present at any material
stage of a trial against him under both the Federal and New York
Constitutions." 12 The court relied on People v. Velasco, 13 which
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1993). Section
260.20 provides:
A defendant must be personally present during the trial of an
indictment; provided, however that a defendant who conducts himself in
so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on
with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/41

2

et al.: Right to Be Present

1996]

RIGHT TO BE PRESENT

1027

held that the defendant's absence from a precharge conference, 14
a side-bar voir dire, 1 5 and a conference in the robing room
16
pertaining to peremptory challenges and challenges for cause,
did not violate his right to be present during material stages of

the proceeding against him under both the Federal and New York
Constitutions.
The court looked to federal precedents in defining a material
stage, as one in which the defendant's "absence would have a

he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues
such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.
Id.
13. 77 N.Y.2d 469, 570 N.E.2d 1070, 568 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1991).
14. Id. at 472, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The precharge
conference, which was held in the court's robing room and attended by counsel
for both sides, encompassed discussions of a stipulation pertaining to the
contents of a medical record, the scheduling of the remainder of the trial, and
the court's closing instructions to the jury. Id. Additionally, the court
considered and denied a motion to dismiss the murder charge and granted a
motion to dismiss the weapons charge. Id. The court found that, since only
questions of law or procedure were entertained during the conference, the
defendant was not required to be present. Id.
15. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The side-bar
voir dire involved questioning prospective jurors at the bench where the
defendant could not hear, but in the presence of counsel for both sides. Id. at
472-73, 570 N.E.2d at 1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The bench conferences
permitted jurors to reply to questions that were asked the jury for
disqualification purposes. Id. As a result of the bench conferences, some jurors
were excused and others returned to the jury box. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at
1071, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The court held that "the determination that a
prospective juror was disqualified before voir dire was a matter for the court
and defendant had no statutory or constitutional right to personally participate
in the discussions leading to the court's ruling." Id. (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 473, 570 N.E.2d at 1072, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 723. In reviewing
the defendant's assertion regarding the conference in the robing room
pertaining to peremptory challenges and challenges for cause, the court held
that the conference did not comprise a material part of the trial since it was
merely a "preliminary advisement" of challenges later exercised and recorded
in open court in the defendant's presence. Id. The court noted that the
defendant did have an "opportunity to consult with his attorney before the
challenges were made." Id.
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substantial effect on his ability to defend himself."17 In Snyder v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,18 the defendant was convicted
of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. 19 He
appealed on the ground that the judge's denial of his motion to be
present at a jury viewing violated his right of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 The United States Supreme Court
held that, although a criminal defendant "in a prosecution for a
felony.., has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to
be present in his own person whenever his presence has a
relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness [sic] of his
opportunity to defend against the charge," this privilege is not
absolute. 2 1 The privilege exists "to the extent that a fair and just
hearing would be thwarted by his absence . . .," but not where
the defendant's "presence would be useless, or the benefit but a
shadow." 22 The Snyder Court found that the defendant's
presence would have served no material purpose, because "he
could neither ask nor answer questions, nor in any way interfere
23
with the acts, observations or conclusions of the jury."
Furthermore, the Court noted that the defendant would be able to
point out any improprieties in the viewing at trial since the
"stenographic transcript of all that was said and done" was made
available to him. 24 Accordingly, the Court affirmed his
conviction.25
In the case at bar, the court concluded that the defendant's
absence from the in camera conference violated the defendant's
right to be present, since it "clearly prejudiced the defendant by
denying him a full and fair opportunity to question this juror
17. Barnes, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (citing Snyder v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)).
18. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Snyder was recently cited with approval in
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
19. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 102-03.

20. Id. at 103.
21. Id. at 105-07.
22. Id. at 106-08.
23. Id. at 112 (citation omitted).

24. Id.
25. Id. at 122.
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regarding any potential bias, to object to the selection of this
juror, or to exercise a peremptory challenge to eliminate this
juror." 26 The court held that "[tihis right cannot be waived by
defense counsel absent ratification by the defendant." 27 The court
noted the absence of any evidence in the record that the defendant
was informed by his attorney of the Assistant District Attorney's
familiarity with the prospective juror. 28 Accordingly, the court
29
reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial.
The New York and Federal Constitutions are similar in that

both guarantee the right to be present. Further, New York has
codified the right to be present. The Federal Constitution due

process standard set forth in Snyder v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts30 parallels the analysis for a deprivation of the
right to be present under the New York Constitution. 3 1 Thus,
26. Barnes, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
27. Id. See People v. Amato, 172 A.D.2d 545, 567 N.Y.S.2d 873 (2d Cir.
1991). In Arnato, the defendant was convicted of first degree assault and third
degree criminal possession of a weapon. Id. at 545, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 874. The
defendant appealed on the ground that the trial court erred in conducting the
trial in his absence. Id. The defendant was not present during the first two
mornings of his trial. Id. Both times, his attorney informed the court that the
defendant was on his way and consented to proceed in his absence. Id. The
court held that, although "a defendant who deliberately absents himself from
the courtroom after the trial has begun forfeits his right to be present," the
court has an affirmative duty to "determine if the defendant's absence is
deliberate and to recite on the record the reasons for its finding." Id. at 545,
567 N.Y.S.2d at 875. The court concluded that "[t]he failure to conduct such
an inquiry constitutes reversible error." Id. The court found that the trial
court's inquiry was only cursory and defense counsel's replies failed to
"indicate that the defendant was deliberately absent." Id. Furthermore, the
court found that the defendant's right to be present "at these particular stages
of trial [were] not waived by defense counsels consent to proceed, and there
[was] no evidence that the defendant ratified his counsel's purported waiver."
Id. at 545-46, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 875. Consequently, the court reversed the
defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial. Id. at 546, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
875.
28. Barnes, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
29. Id.
30. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
31. See People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 604 N.E.2d 95, 590
N.Y.S.2d 33 (1992). In Antomnarchi, the defendant was convicted of criminal
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under the facts in Barnes, it was not necessary to determine
whether the state constitution goes further than the federal
constitution in defining the right to be present.

possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Id. at 249, 604 N.E.2d
at 96, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 34. He appealed on the grounds that his absence from a
portion of the impaneling of the jury constituted a deprivation of his
constitutional and statutory right to be present during a material stage of the
trial against him, as guaranteed under Article I, Section 6 of the New York
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal
Constitutions. Id. The court found that the questioning of prospective jurors
regarding their ability to impartially weigh the evidence and hear testimony
violated the defendant's right to be present during a material stage of the
proceedings. Id. at 250, 604 N.E.2d at 97, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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